I’m kinda frustrated. Living in Europe in a country where you are more or less protected against layouts, were unions are allowed to exist. Jet it is so difficult to get the people to get their head out of their butts to do some solidarity or even improve their own conditions.

Companies doesn’t respect some basic laws and rights, people has been angry for 15 years and always complaining.

Despite of that, when asking people to organize, join an union or do even at least a day of strike, people start saying that it is not worth it, that it is not important. The most they accept doing is stop to work a couple of hours to complain at the gate like a kids rant.

I know for sure that workers have power. The company makes more money per worker and day that double de amount they pay us, so stopping working would hurt them more than us. Why do people lacks so much class conciseness? It is even more hurting for people working at a desk with a suit and doing economics, it’s like they think of themselves as if they were some kind of privileged when are just workers. Why do people chicken out so much when going on strike?

  • agamemnonymous@sh.itjust.works
    1·
    17 hours ago

    Sure, I can only go off what I’ve read. Would you like to recommend a textbook which goes into making predictions when playing a game with irrational players?

    • chonglibloodsport@lemmy.world
      1·
      11 hours ago

      Any mathematical textbook will do it. Try Springer.

      It’s quite simple really. Games in game theory are represented with a payoff matrix which shows the utility for each player. Pure strategies are defined as rows or columns in the payoff matrix. The math of game theory doesn’t care about why a player chooses a particular strategy, only its payoff.

      I would define a purely rational player at minimum as one chooses a dominant strategy, when one is available. You’re free to expand that to mixed strategies and games where (strong or weakly) dominant strategies do not exist. Irrational players would be anyone who is otherwise not a rational player.

      This isn’t very interesting in basic game theory. It becomes a lot more relevant in cooperative game theory, which can have more than 2 players and players forming coalitions.