What’s the give away there? Not doubting just wondering.

I see impedance matched traces so seems like something fast, but that’s all I’d be able to guess.

The real issue is definitely people not having total control over their own devices.

It doesn’t need permissions to be sent pictures from messages though, that’s all local and likely done via an exported Service. Good chance other Google products are or will make use of it in the future.

There are definitely good, non malicious reasons to have it as a separate app and that should actually be preferred. Off the top of my head:

• Separation of permissions - it only has the permissions it asks for instead of every permission messages has
• It can be disabled/removed without disabling messages
• it can be reused by other applications if that’s a desirable feature

Some people might actually like this: thinking of women getting unsolicited dick picks in particular

This is a real exploit chain in cups-browsed. The tl;dr is that it will add basically anything that knows the correct protocol to your list of available printers, and this can be exploited for RCE if you print to the malicious printer. The service listens on all interfaces by default on UDP 631.

It is not as horrible as it was marketed, but it’s real and not great. You may or may not have this service running by default; I didn’t on Fedora.

His full write-up is here: https://www.evilsocket.net/2024/09/26/Attacking-UNIX-systems-via-CUPS-Part-I/